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Abstract 
 
 
Korea is recently debating the introduction of a carbon levy under its green growth 
strategy. The government set an ambitious goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 
30 percent below expected levels in 2020, and established the Framework Act on Green 
Growth in 2010 to meet the emission target and promote eco-friendly investment. The 
government is also preparing for a variety of measures of the green growth and will put 
those plans into action.   
 
This paper explores the design of a carbon tax scheme for green growth in Korea, 
focusing on issues related to the tax base, the tax rates, and the use of the revenues. It 
also shows that the economy-wide effects of a well-designed carbon tax scheme in Korea 
could be “positive” by making use of a number of other fiscal instruments in 
combination.    
 
According to this study, the appropriate size of carbon tax revenue would be about 10 
trillion Won (approximately 1% of GDP) in Korea. Moreover, from experience in 
countries that have already implemented eco-tax reform in Europe, we may need a 
gradual phasing-in of the carbon taxation in broader tax reforms and enhance the use of a 
public information campaign for stronger incentives and political feasibilities. At the 
same time, it is also required to consider secondary instruments such as direct 
compensation payments, price support and tax deductions for unfair burdens of low-
income households and more energy-vulnerable sectors. All those approaches might be 
offset of distributional consequences as mitigating the harmfulness of eco-motivated, 
new fiscal policies.   
 
Lastly, it is pretty obvious that the more we delay action, the more cost we pay. If we 
invest green technology in recent economic slowdown, we will have a global initiative 
that would make our economy more competitive in the long run.  
 
 
 
 
Key Words:  Climate Change, Green Growth, Carbon Tax, Environmental Tax Reform 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Copenhagen Accord in 2009 is meant to represent a broad political 
agreement between countries, including G20, accounting for about 80% of global 
carbon emissions. It requires for developed countries to submit pledges for 
emissions cuts and climate financial aid by 2020 (as an extension of the Kyoto 
protocol), and for developing countries to indicate their voluntary actions 
including targets to cut carbon/energy intensity, to increase renewable energy 
portion, and/or to reduce deforestation. 
 
Recently fifty-five countries have pledged emission cuts to the UN under the 
Copenhagen accord.
1
 These countries account for 78 per cent of global emissions 
from energy use, according to a UNFCCC release.  
 
Asia’s fourth-largest energy consumer set an ambitious goal of cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent below expected levels in 2020 
(November, 2009). This is one of the most aggressive targets in the non-Annex I 
countries. It also promotes environment-friendly investment and development   
(see Table 1). 
 
Korea‟s announcement was made immediately ahead of the much anticipated 
climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009. The Korea‟s target setting is a voluntary 
and unilateral action, and Korea hopes its efforts will create a more conducive 
atmosphere for other developing countries‟ engagement as well as further 
commitments from developed countries.  
 
The Korea‟s national strategy of Green Growth is a comprehensive long-term 
master plan. It envisages three main objectives as follows: (i) to deal effectively 
with climate change and energy independence, (ii) create new growth engines on 
multiple fronts, and (iii) to raise overall quality of life for the people and to 
enhance contribution to the international community through strong advocacy for 
green growth(PCGG, 2008). 
                                                 
1
 It represents the first time that large emerging economies such as China and India have made 
written commitments to the international community that they will curb their carbon emissions. 
 4 
        
Korea recently established a Comprehensive Act on Green Growth to meet the 
emission target and promote environmentally-friendly investment and 
development (January, 2010). The government review is now under way to assess 
the feasibility of a levy on carbon. It is considering using property, automobile, 
and energy-carbon taxes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote green 
growth. It is also pushing for a new Negotiated Agreement(NA) system in 2011  
and a national cap-and-trade system legislation in 2015 and for providing  
support for 10 key green technologies including carbon capture and storage, a 
smart grid and next-generation batteries.
2
  
 
The Korean government prepared for a variety of measures of the green growth 
in 2009 and will put those plans into action(Green Tax & Budget Reform; GTBR 
in Figure 1). Although some companies voiced their worries on the policy 
direction and many of the Korean companies are newcomers to green industries, 
Korean companies have been quite supportive of the Green Growth initiative. 
640 Korean companies would start participating in a voluntary pilot carbon 
emissions trading system from 2010. 
 
The government also established the Global Green Growth Institute(GGGI) in 
Seoul (June, 2010) to help countries share their policy experiences on climate 
change and to enhance their world-wide green growth strategies. 
 
In particular, the introduction of a carbon tax is becoming part of a major process 
integrated into an environmental tax reform(ETR) or GRBR in Korea.
 3
 Study 
groups, including academics and policy-makers, are evaluating the validity of 
carbon taxes under the green growth strategy.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 A smart grid system enables homes and factories to use electricity during off-peak hours 
through a two-way communication between power suppliers and consumers. Korea established a 
major test bed facility for the smart grid system on Jeju Island in 2009, which will be completed 
by 2013.  
3
 In this paper we will use GTBR and ETR interchangeably where the former has a broader 
concept than the latter. 
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Table 1.  The Copenhagen-Accord Emissions Reduction Targets by 2020 
     (Unit : %) 
 
CO2 emissions 
relative to 
Carbon 
Intensity 
relative to 
 1990 level 
2000 
level 
2005 
level 
2020 
BAU* 
2005 level 
EU states 20     
Norway 40     
Croatia 5     
US   17   
Canada   17   
Moldova 25     
South Africa    34  
Brazil    38.9  
Russia 25     
      
Japan 25     
Australia  25    
New Zealand 20     
South Korea    30  
Indonesia    26  
Singapore    16  
China     45 
India     25 
Note: BAU represents Business as usual case with no climate policy 
Source: UNFCCC, 2010;  Boao Report, 2010 
 
 
 
In Section II, this paper begins with discussing theoretical mechanisms of GTBR 
as fiscal policies that use incentives and disincentives through taxation and 
government spending for green growth. Next, Section III explores the design of a 
carbon tax scheme for green growth in Korea, focusing on issues related to the 
tax base, the tax rates, and the use of the revenues. It then shows that the 
economy-wide effects of a well-designed carbon tax scheme could be positive by 
making use of a number of other fiscal instruments in combination. Finally 
Section IV offers some concluding remarks.   
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Figure 1. Objectives of Green Tax and Budget Reform (GTBR) 
 
 
 
 
 
II. MECHANISMS FOR GREEN GROWTH 
 
 
2.1  Theoretical Backgrounds 
 
When can environmental fiscal reform boost both economic growth and social 
welfare? To ensure that economic growth and the preservation of environmental 
quality are compatible and socially optimal, it is crucial to understand the 
interactions among economic activities, technological progress, and ecological 
processes over time.  Policies for ecologically sustainable economic growth 
(green growth) may be more effective if technological progress in abatement 
knowledge responds to economic incentives.  If so, how can environmental 
investment and taxation contribute to the productivity of private factors of 
 7 
production and to green growth, and how much sustainable development can we 
expect from these policies?  
 
This section discusses environmental fiscal policies, using Fullerton and Kim 
(2008)‟s model, within an endogenous growth model with pollution, distortionary 
income taxes, and three assets: natural capital, abatement knowledge, and private 
capital (both physical and human capital).
4
  
 
Here, individual household utility (U) depends on consumption (C) of the final 
good and on the quality of the environment (N). This environmental quality is a 
stock that acts as a nonrival consumption good but also as a productive public 
input to production. The economy has three types of assets. The first is private 
capital (K, including both physical and human capital), and the second is public 
abatement knowledge capital (H, a nonrival environmental R&D good). Either of 
these first two types of asset can be accumulated by devoting to it some fraction 
of output. The third type of asset is environmental quality (natural capital), which 
is modeled as a stock of a renewable resource. Pollution (P) is inevitable from 
production activities, but it can be reduced by increasing the stock of pollution 
abatement knowledge (e.g., clean technology) and by imposing environmental 
regulations on production activities (e.g., pollution standards, permit, or taxes).  
 
Also, 'effective pollution (Z),' is an input that can be provided either by actual 
pollution (P) or through the stock of available public abatement knowledge (H). 
Thus, the same output can be achieved with less actual pollution if the firm has 
access to more abatement knowledge. The parameter  denotes a pollution-
conversion factor (or productivity difference of P relative to H): a higher   
                                                 
4
  Recent advances in endogenous growth theories have opened up the possibility of analyzing the 
growth effects of various policy changes in the long-run (Fig. A8). In particular, models with the 
environment along this line argue that a tighter environmental policy may boost growth, at least in 
the long-run. They derive optimal environmental policies for internalizing environmental 
externalities in a sustainable growth framework.  However, most of these previous models simply 
assume that the public sector's environmental R&D activities to generate pollution abatement 
knowledge are financed through lump-sum taxation rather than through other distortionary taxes. 
Fig. A1 in Appendix depicts a schematic diagram for greening the tax and budget system towards 
ecologically sustainable economic growth. 
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makes pollution more effective, or equivalently, makes abatement relatively less 
effective.
5
 
 
Following Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), growth and depletion of the 
renewable natural resource are modeled according to the following accumulation 
equation (See Fig. A2):  
 
    PNEN  )( ,   where  E'  E/N  ≶0    and    E"  ∂2E/∂N2 < 0,        (1) 
 
where N  denotes the stock of natural capital (environmental quality), P is 
pollution, and where a dot over any variable represents the change over time.  
E(N) represents ecological growth through regeneration processes.  This 
regeneration might initially increase with a larger N (that is, E' > 0), but it 
eventually peaks and declines (E' < 0) as the environment approaches its natural 
state.  Thus, natural capital accumulation features diminishing returns (E" < 0). 
The second term, pollution P, indicates the deterioration of environmental quality 
through the extractive use of natural resources in production (e.g., using up clean 
air or water). On a sustainable steady-state path where 0N , eq. (1) implies that 
P = E(N). Thus, E(N) represents the absorption capacity of the environment. 
 
Here, we have three main tensions or sets of opposing forces that affect welfare 
and growth.  First, a cut in pollution has a direct effect that reduces output, but it 
has an indirect effect that raises output through the increase in environmental 
quality. A second tension is that growth may cause pollution, but it also generates 
resources for abatement knowledge that may reduce pollution. The improved 
quality of the environment or the increased stock of abatement knowledge can 
allow the economy to absorb a larger flow of effective pollution in the steady 
state. Finally, the economy also has a tension between the positive effects of 
investment in abatement knowledge and the negative effects from distortionary 
                                                 
5
  Unlike the literature, we here generalize the treatment of pollution and abatement in production 
so that they are not equally effective. The addition of this one parameter has important 
implications, however, as environmental policy no longer must have the same effect on growth as 
on welfare. This pollution-conversion parameter () reflects mainly “eco-efficiency” related to 
country-specific production structures or endowment conditions, and so we do not impose any 
prior restrictions on it. Indeed, we show how the difference between the productivities of man-
made input H and natural input P plays a crucial role in determining optimal environmental and 
fiscal policy. The studies by Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996) do not consider this 
possibility but just assume  Z = HP  and    = 1. 
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income taxes made necessary by that increase in non-productive government 
spending.  
 
2.2  Components of Green Tax and Budget Reform 
 
The government here is assumed to raise revenues by adopting a positive income 
tax rate, K , and a positive pollution tax, P .  Tax revenues are used to finance 
“government expenditures on public investment” ( Hq H   H Hq H ) and lump-
sum transfers to households (G).  Further, we suppose that government fixes the 
ratio of the lump-sum transfer payments relative to private income, /G rK  . 
This parameter is used below as a measure of the extent to which distorting taxes 
are necessary. Assuming a balanced budget at any moment, the budget constraint 
of government can be written as:  
 
K P H H HrK P q H q H G      ,    or  (dividing by  rK),            (2a)  
K  + /PP rK  =   +  ,                             (2b)  
 
where /PP rK  represents the ratio of pollution tax revenue to private capital 
income,
6
 and where   /H H Hq H q H rK    is the ratio of gross public 
investment in abatement knowledge to private capital income.
7
 
For the market economy described above, a benevolent government needs to 
intervene to ensure the optimal provision of the two public goods N and H. In this 
case, where lump-sum taxation is not available, it is important to know how the 
public investment in abatement knowledge is financed and what becomes of the 
taxes collected. Government must take as given the decentralized optimizing 
behavior of firms and households, the ecological constraint, and government 
budget constraint, while affecting the allocation of resources among the three 
type of capital (K, H, and N) through its policy variables ( ,K  ,P and H ). Then, 
in this second-best world, it must act to satisfy the following „arbitrage 
condition‟: 
                                                 
6
  From the firm's first-order conditions, we know that the ratio of pollution tax revenue to private 
capital income is  PP/rK =  /(1- ), which is always constant in our economy.  
 
7
  For environmental and non-environmental taxes in OECD countries, see Fig. A13 in Appendix.  
In particular, this shows environmental tax burden relative to other taxes in 2002.   
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1 1
(1 ) /H PK K H
H H P P
F q U U A E
r A P F
q Z q N C N N
   
 
     
              
 , (3) 
 
 
which says that investments in the three types of capital are traded off against 
each other and also against household savings. The first equality in eq. (3) says 
that the net return on private investments [ (1 )K Kr   ] should match the return 
on investment in abatement knowledge (consisting of the current return in 
production and a capital gain), given the economy-wide pollution level, P.  The 
second equality in eq. (3) says that environmental quality  N  should also earn the 
same rate of return as public abatement knowledge. The return on environmental 
quality in eq. (3) consists of (i) its contribution to utility (the consumption 
externality), (ii) its contribution to total factor productivity (the production 
externality), (iii) its contribution to ecological processes (marginal absorption 
capacity), and (iv) a scarcity rent (capital gain). The Hotelling rule states that if 
the natural resource is exhaustible, the rate of its price increase ( /P P  ) should 
equal the rate of return on private capital. Hence, eq. (3) can be interpreted as a 
generalized Hotelling rule for renewable natural resource (in the presence of 
distortionary taxation). 
Optimal corrective policy rules in our economy induce the market equilibrium 
path to match the socially-efficient path. What level of policy rules should then 
be adopted to maximize social welfare, including concerns about global warming, 
and how do the resulting long-run growth outcomes react to changes in the set of 
economic and natural parameters in the economy? These questions often arise in 
environmental fiscal policy debates over greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement. 
 
How are growth and welfare affected by a tighter environmental policy in the 
presence of the externalities and distortionary taxation?  It is typically argued that 
pollution control hurts growth by raising abatement costs.
8
  With endogenous 
growth, however, environmental policy may have permanent effects on the 
                                                 
8
 Most of the early literature assumes exogenous technological progress that is independent of 
environmental policy as in Fig. A8. See Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990), Nordhaus (1994), and 
Goulder (1995) among many others.  In these models, environmental protection has costs that 
reduce growth (see Fig. A9).  
rate of return on private capital  rate of return on abatement knowledge rate of return on natural capital 
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productivity of the economy. If pollution taxes are sub-optimally low, for 
example, then pollution is excessive.  Natural capital is then under-accumulated, 
which affects production. 
 
To investigate the growth effects of tighter environmental policy, we can see the 
long-run growth rate then reacts to changes in pollution taxation as: 
 
     
1
(1 ) ( ) 1K K EN N
ddg
r E N
d d

 
    
  
 
     
 
,                           (4)  
 
 
where  ( / )( / )N dN d N    is the elasticity of natural capital with respect to 
the pollution tax and  ( / )( / )EN dE dN N E    is the elasticity of the absorption 
capacity of the environment with respect to natural capital. In our model, the 
curve that relates environmental tax rates and their growth (or welfare) effects 
can now be in an “inverted U-shape” function. Also, we can have the relationship 
between the growth-maximizing pollution tax and the welfare-maximizing 
pollution tax.  
 
 
 
1/
(0) (0) 1 (1 )
( ) 1 ( )
(1 1/ ) 1
EN N
K C NdW W dg
E N N
d g g d



  
   
     

   
     
    
   (5) 
 
 
As illustrated in Fig. A11, note that maximizing growth is not equivalent to 
maximizing welfare, and the first term in eq. (5) reveals the difference. The key 
parameters affecting this difference are the size of tax distortions (), the 
productivity of pollution relative to abatement knowledge (), and the 
differentiated additional effects of  on welfare and environmental sustainability 
by ( )EN N   .  
 
 
 
 
 
tax replacement effect improved productivity effect for private capital 
welfare effect growth effect 
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III. CARBON TAX SCHEME FOR GREEN 
GROWTH IN KOREA 
 
 
3.1  Why-questions 
 
 
How will we meet the difficult global challenges before us, while 
simultaneously improving people’s lives and conserving the environment?  
 
There is a widespread agreement on globally based efforts to investigate how to 
help the environment economically, with ultimate objective of stabilizing climate 
change. For practical purpose, environmental taxation becomes a credible choice 
in the ongoing policy discussion over how best to address global warming and to 
comply with implementing the President Lee‟s „Low-Carbon, Green Growth‟ 
project.  
 
Green Growth purports to achieve economic growth with generating enough jobs 
while preserving the limited ecological carrying capacity of the environment. 
Environmental Tax Reform (ETR), as partly illustrated in Figure 2, is the term 
used for changes in the national tax system where the burden of taxes shifts from 
„goods‟, such as labor, capital or clean consumption to „bads‟ such as activities 
that lead to environmental pressures. It is one of the key instruments to achieve 
the plan which would be both fiscally prudent and environmentally sound. 
 
OECD countries have continued to increase and refine their use of environmental 
tax instruments for ETR since early 1990s. Countries in Nordic region including 
Finland (1990), then Sweden (1991) and Denmark (1993) were the first to launch 
such reforms, followed by the Netherlands (1996, 2001), Germany (1999) and the 
United Kingdom (1996, 2001 and 2002). 
 
With its current draft, economic and environmental effects of ETR are quite 
positive. And some countries have shown considerable efforts in developing ETR 
in recent years. For example, environmental tax revenues have increased by about 
36% since the launch of the German ETR in 1999. As part of the German 
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program, about an additional EUR 20 billion was raised by energy taxed in 2003. 
The Swedish ETR contributes about 0.1% of GDP.  
 
 
Figure 2. The Concept of Greening the Tax and Budget System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-environmental taxes 
/revenues, K 
(income & profits,  etc.) 
 
 
 
                       Greener 
 
 
Environmentally related 
budgets (R&D, expenditure),  
 
 
            Greener  
       
 
 
 
 
Non-environmental budgets,   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmentally related 
taxes/revenues ,  
 
(Tax System)                                            (Budget System) 
 
 
 
Taxes on motor fuels and motor vehicles have been rather stable as portion of 
total tax revenues generated about 90% of the revenue from environmentally 
related taxes in the European Union. They have designed taxes that target a 
broader array of tax bases, not only to reduce CO2 emissions but also to cope 
with air pollution, noise levels and traffic congestion, including plastic bags, 
landfill waste, aggregates, batteries and pesticides. 
 
For example, Table 2 provides an overview of the use of environmental taxes and 
charges in OECD countries. There are proven cases of eco benefits for each type 
of instruments. Taxes and charges have proved effective as shown by congestion 
charging in London, road-user charging for heavy goods vehicles in Switzerland, 
NOx (Nitrogen Oxides) taxes on air pollution in Sweden, and plastic bag levies in 
Ireland. Tax differentials were of major importance for unleaded fuel.  
 
Tax 
reform 
Budget 
reform 
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Some policy instruments are not feasible without suitable monitoring or 
administrative capacity. And there is no single recipe for a successful and 
effective tax scheme. Different factors determine the functioning of the specific 
schemes, each in their own context.  
 
Examples include the Danish waste-disposal tax (high tax rates), the Norwegian 
pesticide tax (tax rates differentiated according to toxicity), the London 
congestion charge (strong champion; rather high charge), and Irish plastic bag tax 
(awareness of the advantage and simplicity of alternative behavior).  
 
 
Table 2. Examples of Environmental Taxes 
 
Eco Tax Country Remarks 
Energy and CO2 
-Norway : CO2 tax 
-Germany: Energy tax  
-2% reduction in CO2 
emission 
-Increase in the world price 
of oil 
Air Pollution  -Sweden: NOx charge Unique example 
Agricultural input -Norway: Tax on 
pesticides  
 
Product  -Ireland: Plastic bag levy Reduction around 90% of 
carrier bags 
Waste 
-Denmark:: Waste tax 
-UK: Landfill tax 
-Reduction in waste 
 
Water 
-Netherlands: 
Wastewater 
effluent chares 
-Denmark:  Tax on tap 
water 
-Water Pollution decrease 
90 % 
-26% reduction in total 
water consumption 
Transport 
-London, UK: Congestion 
charge 
-Switzerland: Road-user 
charges 
-Reduced congestion in 
zone / Increased interest 
from other countries 
 
Sources :  OECD/EEA database on environment-related taxes, Ministries of Finance and Environment of the 
European countries 
 
 
The positive effects of ETR are the reduction of energy consumption, the 
decrease of CO2 emissions, the diversification of energy sources, the creation of 
specialized employment, and the promotion of green technologies.  
 
One negative short-term impact is on heavy energy users such as fossil fuel 
electricity and steel industry. Undoubtedly, the eco tax reform would be more 
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effective and the impact on international competitiveness would be smaller if 
more countries participate or take equivalent measures.   
 
My own analysis of the „green-growth potential indicator‟(or “win-win” potential 
index) shows that green growth relies crucially on the degree of prior tax 
distortions and eco-efficiency. Here the “win-win” potential index is defined as 
the ratio of eco-efficiency to prior tax distortion for each country as an illustration.  
 
Figure 3 indicates that Korea‟s “win-win” potential index is ranked to 18th in 30 
OECD countries. The Korea‟s “win-win” potential index is 5.74 that is lower 
than the OECD average 7.02, and it is well behind to some cases of 
Switzerland(21.25), Japan(16.64), Norway(12.97), United Kingdom(8.70) and 
US(7.16).  This is mainly due to industrial production structures and people‟s 
consumption patterns that are still not energy-efficient and environmentally 
unfriendly in Korea.  
 
 
Figure 3. The “Win-Win” Potential Index : The Case of Global Warming 
 
"win-win" potential index (eco-efficiency/prior tax distortion)
0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00
Slovak Republic
Poland
Hungary
Turkey
Australia
Greece
Canada
Finland
Belgium
N.zealand
Portugal
Korea
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Spain
Germany
USA
Denmark
Austria
UK
France
Mexico
Ireland
Sweden
Iceland
Norway
Japan
Switzerland
average = 7.02
 
Source: Kim, S.-R. (2005), First Regional Policy Dialogue, UNESCAP International  
Conference, p.157. 
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3.2  When-questions 
 
The more we delay, the more we pay. 
 
How much we lose if we delay optimal fiscal policies for ecologically sustainable 
development? In case with a climate sensitivity of 3.4 (i.e., the degree of 3.4 
0
C 
temperature increase of doubling CO2 concentration), my own calculation, using 
Nordhaus-Boyer DICE model, indicates that the cost of regrets by 10-years delay 
amounts to about 4% of Gross World Product, which wipes out South Korea‟s 
GDP in 2000.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Distribution of “Regrets” as a function of Procrastination 
 
(a)  Carbon reduction schedule 
 
(b)  Regrets of prograstination 
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Here, the “regrets,” as a social cost of procrastination, is approximated by the net-
present value of the future consumption losses of optimal policies “with each 
specific procrastination constraint” relative to “without procrastination activities”.  
 
This result reveals that, even with uncertainty, the “regrets” are not negligible but 
significant. Figure 4 implies that the endogenously calculated possibility and risk 
of probabilistic regrets can increase substantially with the years of procrastination.  
 
Not only developed countries but also developing countries and economies in 
transition need to actively take part in shifting to more eco-efficient production 
and consumption patterns. 
 
Compared with other countries, Korea‟s ecological footprint was short as 
calculated by the UN Environment Program. The increasing rate of carbon 
emission in Korea is one of the highest around the world due to the high degree 
of dependence on heavy and chemistry-based industrial structure. Also, lack of 
understanding of energy savings makes our energy efficiency less competitive. 
 
 
3.3  How-questions 
 
The Korean government is now mulling the introduction of a carbon tax, which 
taxes the combustion of fossil fuels according to their carbon contents.   
 
The implementation of a carbon tax has to be met by increasing energy efficiency 
and using low-carbon energy sources which would reduce CO2 emissions, and it 
could provide more explicit price signal for firms to promote the development of 
new emission-reduction technologies.  
 
The taxation of energy in Korea has been earmarked mostly for transportation 
infrastructure so far and still allowed for tax reductions and exemptions for most 
energy-intensive sectors, undermining seriously its environmental effectiveness. 
For example, the earmarked "transportation-energy-environment tax" (which is 
subject to a 2012 clause) would need to be converted an individual consumption 
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tax so as to increase the allocative efficiency and the flexibility of government 
spendings.  
 
 
 
Table 3.   Energy Taxation in Korea (2010. 1) 
 
 
Gasoline 
(won/ℓ) 
Kerosene 
(won/ℓ) 
Light oil 
(won/ℓ) 
Heavy 
oil 
(won/ℓ) 
LPG (won//kg) 
LNG1) 
(won/m3) propane Butane 
Customs 
Tax 
General 5% 3% 3% 
Quota 
(Provisional) 
3% 2% 2% 
Individual 
Cons.  Tax 
General - 90 - 17 20 252 48 
Flexibility - 63 - - 14 
275 
(161 
won/ℓ) 
 
Trans. 
Energy 
Environ. 
Tax 
General 475 - 340 - - - - 
Flexibility 529 - 375 - - - - 
Education Tax3) 79 14 56 3 - 
41 
 (24 
won/ℓ) 
- 
Local  Drive Tax4) 138 - 98 - - - - 
VAT 10% 
Import Fee 16 - 19.58 
Quality Examination  
Fee 
0.430 0.027 - 
Safety Management Levy - - - - 4.5 3.9 
Sales Levy 
36 
(High) 
- - - - 
62.283 
(36.42 
won/ℓ) 
- 
Total Tax 
Amount 
Amount 897 198 661 87 184 
527 
(308 
won/ℓ) 
120 
Price  Share 
Ration 
54% 19% 46% 12% 10% 32% 15% 
Consumption  Price 1,661 1,040 1,450 744 1,808 
1,636 
(957 
won/ℓ) 
783 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance(2010)  
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Based on experience in OECD countries, Korea should shift more some of tax 
burdens from income to energy, while addressing properly their potential impact 
on international competitiveness and distributional concerns. To do this, the 
Korean government needs to consider further the full environmental costs and 
other external costs in setting tax rates on energy, phasing out various exemptions 
and environmentally harmful subsidies, and introduce a carbon tax to curb CO2 
emissions in the near future.  
 
According to the analysis of McKinsey‟s Antonio Volpin and Cambridge 
Econometrics in UK, the average market price per ton of CO2 emission trading is 
estimated to 25 EUR (= 31,828 KRW in 2007) from 2008 to 2012. Following this, 
Kim et al.(2008) suggest a carbon tax scheme for Korea in Figure 5, as the rate of 
emission cost per each energy source can be measured by multiplying the price 
31,828 won and the unit amount of CO2 emissions.
 9
   
 
 
 
Figure 5.  The Estimated CO2 emission Cost per Each Energy Source 
in Korea 
The estimated CO2 emission cost per each energy source in Korea
 67
 82
 78
 95
 53
 92
 71
 59
 34Bituminous Coal (won/kg)
Anthracite Coal (won/kg)
LNG (won/m³)
Propane (won/kg)
Butane (won/ℓ)
B-C oil (won/ℓ)
Kerosene (won/ℓ)
Diesel (won/ℓ)
Gasoline (won/ℓ)
Social Cost (won/unit)
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Rates of tax rates are defined separately for each energy sources, and relative tax levels on 
different energy sources are set so as to equate the implicit rate of tax per unit of CO2.  
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However, cutting CO2 emissions would involve costs that are uncertain but could 
be substantial. As in Table 4, a “gradually rising” tax, starting with a “low-rate” 
carbon tax of 2.94 EUR per ton of CO2, e.g., 1 trillion KRW tax revenue (= 0.1% 
of GDP), would allow for a smoother transition to a less carbon-intensive 
economy and could be more politically-feasible. Businesses and households 
would have more time to replace their equipment and energy-use practices with 
more efficient alternatives.
10
  
 
 
Table 4.   Proposed Carbon Tax Schemes on Energy Consumption in Korea 
 
Energy sources 
Gasoline 
(won/ℓ) 
Diesel 
(won/ℓ) 
Kerosene 
(won/ℓ) 
B-C oil 
(won/ℓ) 
Butane 
(won/ℓ) 
Propane 
(won/kg) 
LNG 
(won/kg) 
Bituminous. 
coal 
(won/kg) 
Energy taxation 
(excl. VAT ) 
745 528 104 20 185 20 60 Exempted 
Carbon 
taxation 
Social 
Cost 
(ideal) 
67.5 
(4.4%) 
82.4 
(6.5%) 
77.7 
(8.29%) 
95.5 
(19.4%) 
53.2 
(6.9%) 
92.0 
(6.9%) 
71.0 
(11.1%) 
33.7 
(45.6%) 
Low-
Rate 
(realistic) 
8 
(0.5%) 
10 
(0.8%) 
9 
(1.0%) 
11 
(2.3%) 
6 
(0.8%) 
11 
(0.8%) 
10 
(1.3%) 
4 
(5.3%) 
Note: 1)  Numbers in parenthesis represents increase in  prices for each energy products by carbon taxation 
          2)  Scenarios for carbon taxation of ‘Social Cost’ and ‘Low-Rate’ are assumed to raise 8.9 tril. KRW  
and 1.0 tril. KRW of tax revenues respectively. 
 
From experience in countries that have already implemented eco tax reform in 
Europe, we may need a gradual phasing-in of the reforms and enhance the use of 
a public information campaign for stronger incentives and political feasibilities. 
UK‟s fuel duty escalator can be a good example as a slow but sure way of 
making policy instruments more demanding and effective.  
 
Moreover, implementing a new carbon tax system (energy-carbon tax or elements 
of carbon tax in a broader tax system) would have scope for reducing more 
distortive other prior taxes in Korea such as corporate income taxes. It could be 
also used to increase tax benefits for various corporate investment and R&D 
efforts in carbon reduction activities.  
                                                 
10
 The proposed carbon tax rates would need to be raised in line with inflation (or GDP growth 
rate) every year to maintain the environmental incentives of the tax.  
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The Korean government could introduce a new energy-carbon tax in 2013 to 
partly offset public budget deficits from its scheduled, consecutive corporate 
income tax cuts (e.g., the size of carbon tax revenue, 0.1 – 0.3% of GDP). 
Introducing carbon tax would help cut emissions and stimulate clean technology 
investment.  
 
In fact, eco tax reform would lead to increased competitiveness as a result of 
fiscally neutral and net positive effects on employment due to the decrease of 
more distortive taxes on income and the promotion of innovation of new green 
R&D technologies. 
 
Relative to other non-revenue-raising environmental instruments that achieve the 
same goals, carbon taxation could have positive economy-wide effects depending 
on the methods of recycling the tax revenues.    
 
For example, a policy simulation using a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model(DCGE) by Kim et al.(2010) shows that the overall “positive” 
effect on economic efficiency(GDP) would be significant when implementing a 
new carbon tax scheme from 2013 together with corporate income tax(CIT) cuts 
and eco-R&D subsidies in Korea (see Figure 6).
 11
  
 
The Korean government is also pushing for other policy instruments such as 
Negotiated Agreement(NA) system and Cap-and-Trade system. Under the new 
NA system in 2013, companies will negotiate binding agreement with the 
government on energy use and greenhouse gas reduction targets. If businesses 
fail to meet the targets, they should pay penalties such as correcting mandates and 
fines. Also, based on the Comprehensive Act on Green Growth, the government 
is planning to introduce a Cap-and-Trade system for CO2 permits in 2015.    
 
This is time for setting up the Korea‟s Eco Tax Reform with a view to our future 
development and it should also reflect more closely the sustainable issue being 
addressed.  
 
                                                 
11
 For technical details of the model structure, see Kim et al. (2010).  
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On the early stage of implementing eco tax reform in many countries, there were 
concerns about losing international competitiveness of industries and business 
association.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Efficiency Effects of Alternative Revenue-recycling Schemes  
from Carbon Taxation in Korea :  25 EUR Case  
 
          (a) CO2 emissions 
 
(b) GDP 
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However, as regards of impact of the scheme has been successful through 
performing with clear goal and collecting public opinions. In Germany it could 
achieve by differentiating tax rates and making special provisions for vulnerable 
groups. So that private households and small businesses are those who are 
unlikely to pay high rates.  In UK, there has been extensive consultation with 
business and designed in a way that protects the competitiveness of UK firms. 
UK industries and businesses receive a 80% discount to Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) in return for Climate Change Agreements(CCA) to meet energy efficiency 
and/or carbon emission targets.        
 
It is also important to devise appropriate compensation fiscal schemes for the 
poor households group. Applying new environmental taxes in full, combined 
with compensation schemes for the poor, would be the role of environmental 
taxation. OECD recommends ex post direct compensations rather than ex ante tax 
exemptions of this purpose.  
 
 
Table 5.   Distributional Effects of Carbon Taxation in Korea :  
The 'Low-Rate' Tax Case 
 
(2007 Year, Thousand KRW) 
Income 
deciles 
1(Poorest) 2nd 3st 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10(Richest) 
Aver- 
age 
Burden on 
Non-energy 
products(A) 
8.04  10.04  12.05  13.98  15.54  17.64  19.41  20.69  24.04  34.69  17.68  
Burden on 
Energy 
products(B) 
10.69  13.20  17.65  19.16  20.80  22.74  24.08  26.79  28.45  35.82  22.24  
Coal 0.87  0.60  0.41  0.65  0.40  0.55  0.33  0.19  0.33  0.20  0.47  
Petroleum 4.46  5.95  8.86  10.15  11.75  13.08  14.28  16.12  17.38  23.13  12.67  
Gas 3.31  4.29  5.68  5.74  5.87  6.26  6.61  7.33  7.40  8.48  6.18  
Electricity 2.05  2.35  2.69  2.61  2.78  2.85  2.87  3.16  3.34  4.02  2.92  
Total burden 
(A+B) 
18.73  23.24  29.69  33.14  36.34  40.38  43.49  47.48  52.48  70.52  39.92  
Note:  ‘Low-Rate’ scenario of carbon taxation is assumed to raise 1.0 trillion KRW of tax revenue  
(= 0.1% of GDP). Gini coefficient relative to income slightly increases by 0.0403% from  
0.3408 before tax  to 0.3410 after  tax. 
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For the 'Low-Rate' carbon tax scenario in Table 4, the negative effects of the new 
tax on income distribution would be minimal. Using the method of a general 
equilibrium incidence analysis by Wier et al.(2005), my own calculation on 
carbon tax incidence in Korea indicates that the low-rate carbon tax would be not 
significantly regressive(see Table 5). In this case, only small amount of additional 
revenue from carbon taxation can be used to provide higher transfers to poorer 
households to at least leave them no worse off. In the case of this „Low-Rate‟ 
scenario, the benefits from carbon taxation would largely depend on how the 
revenue is spent rather than how it is raised.  
 
3.4  Other Considerations 
 
It is important to maintain transparency and ensure the participation of businesses 
and local people in the planning and use of the tax which can defuse potential 
opposition to a new environmental tax charge.
12
  
 
Public would be more inclined to support new carbon taxes if the tax revenues 
are used to fund a broader package of measures such as environmental projects 
and/or enhanced capital allowances for investment certain energy-saving /green 
technologies. It could help gain industry buy-in and reduce the cost of business 
arising from carbon taxation.  
 
For Korea, the carbon tax scheme would need to designed alongside a broader 
fiscal package of measures (notionally funded from carbon tax revenues) in order 
to protect the international competitiveness of firms. For instance, energy-
intensive industries could receive a discount to the proposed carbon tax rates in 
return for joining a successful NA programs to improve energy efficiency and/or 
reduce emissions to specific levels.  
 
Hypothecation of part of carbon tax revenue to subsidize green projects in 
industries and/or low-income families could also raise public acceptability of new   
carbon taxation.  
                                                 
12
 In this respect the problem of implementing a new carbon tax is often political issues rather 
than economic issues. 
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Knowledge transfer between countries (e.g., via GGGI) about the use of 
economic instruments in environmental policy would be desirable, whereby 
country-specific conditions are being considered when such a transfer is done.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Current energy tax system in Korea is not sufficient for fostering low-carbon, 
green growth. In some parts, the government is subsidizing environmentally- 
harmful behaviors such as fossil fuel consumption, while considering imposing 
carbon taxes on those same behaviors later on. 
 
It is time to take concrete measures to implement the national green growth 
strategy. One of such measures will be to introduce a carbon tax in the near future. 
It is also important to invent “smart” ways of recycling the carbon tax revenues to 
achieve its voluntary CO2 reduction target and provide technological momentum 
for “green growth” development. The introduction of the tax scheme would be a 
starting point for the nation's campaign to increase energy-efficiency, combat 
climate change and promote nation-wide green technologies.  
 
The government needs to formulate “smart” taxation and fiscal schemes to 
promote, rather than thwart, innovation for low-carbon, green growth. So, green 
tax commissions‟ or „inter-ministerial committees‟ for national eco-tax reform 
should also be emphasized. They can make detailed and more realistic proposals 
for mid- and long-term environmental tax reform in Korea and act as a forum for 
discussion on topics that include design, rates and the likely impacts. Analyzing 
and recommending to reform by political parties and academic and institute 
circles can be available. 
 
More attention needs to be paid to increase the knowledge of designing 
environmental tax schemes with continued research and development. 
 
In implementing the appropriate eco tax reform, it is necessary to weigh partly 
conflicting demands against each other for energy-intensive sectors, ecological 
effectiveness, economic efficiency, compatibility with market principles and 
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issues of administrative feasibility. Such a balance must be determined politically 
in order to reduce uncertainty about future development.  
 
There are still ways to go, even though government got off to a first step to eco-
sound fiscal policies. Compared with other OECD countries, Korea has less 
energy-efficient industrial structures with complicated fiscal policies and large 
differences of tax burdens on each energy-demanding sectors.  
 
 
Table 6.  Example Roadmap for Eco Tax Reform in Korea (2010-) 
 
Policy 
Instruments 
Plans 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
Eco tax Reform 
(including energy- 
carbon taxes  
and elements of  
carbon tax) 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
  
Full 
   
       
ETS  
(Cap and trade) 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
    
Full 
 
       
V.A or N.A. 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
Phase I 
 
Phase 
II    
       
Compensation for 
Key Industries‟ 
competitiveness 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
  
Full 
   
       
Pro-poor policies 
(redistribution) 
       
Prepare/ 
Phase-
In 
  
Full 
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Therefore, Korea is now facing to prepare for the post-Kyoto scheme which 
would enforce to find a new paradigm for dealing with environmental 
sustainability and economic growth. In order to implement the Korea‟s new 
scheme successfully, a key theme “green taxes” would be essential to provide 
greater efficiency gain through helping to „get the prices right‟ associated with 
their environmental externalities.  
 
Further, it is required to consider secondary instruments such as direct 
compensation payments, price support and tax exemptions for unfair burdens of 
low-income households and more energy-vulnerable sectors. All those 
approaches might be offset of distributional consequences as mitigating the 
harmfulness of eco-motivated fiscal policies.  
 
It‟s pretty obvious that the more we delay action, the more cost we pay. If we 
invest green technology in recent economic slowdown, we will have a global 
initiative that would make our economy more competitive in the long run.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
The “Green” Growth Model  (Fullerton and Kim, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous Variables  
Utility (U) 
Consumption (C) 
Output (Y) 
Environmental Quality (N) 
Private Capital (K) 
Abatement Knowledge (H) 
Pollution (P) 
Effective Pollution (Z)                   
 
Key parameters  
Environmental preference () 
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution () 
Time preference rate () 
Environmental productivity () 
Pollution-conversion factor () 
Output elasticity of abatement knowledge (á) 
Ecological capacity factor ()                              
Degree of prior tax distortion () 
 
Policy instruments 
Pollution tax  (p ) 
Private capital income tax  (K ) 
Public investment in environmental R&D ( H ) 
 
 
 
Fig.  A1.   Diagram of Greening the Tax and Budget System Towards Sustainable Economic Growth  
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without pollution 
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Fig.  A2.   The Regeneration of the Environment.  „Sustainable development‟ ( 0N  ) requires that pollution P is constant in the 
long run and does not exceed the maximum absorption capacity. Due to the concavity of E(N), two levels of N may have 0N  . One 
has low N with E' > 0, and the other has high N with E' < 0. With a constant level of pollution P, only the latter equilibrium is stable, so 
this study focuses on that case.  For more details, see Neher (1990), Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), and Bovenberg and Smulders 
(1995, 1996). 
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Fig.  A3.  Possible Win-Win Outcomes from Green Tax and Budget Reform (GTBR) 
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Fig.  A4.  Comparison of OECD countries: Tax Structure, Energy Intensity, CO2 Intensity, and Renewables Portion   
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where environmental tax rate =   1)1/(1 1  ULLD ttMt   
labor tax rate  = Lt   
marginal environmental damage = )( MEDP    
uncompensated labor supply elasticity = 
U   
  
 
Fig.  A5.  Graphical Illustration of Eco Tax Reform (ETR) from Income Tax to Energy Tax   
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 Pearce (1991):  Environmental taxes might offer a so-called  “double dividend (DD)” (i.e.,  these taxes not only improve  
the environment but might also reduce welfare costs of the overall tax system).  
=>   Related question: “Whether the optimal environmental tax in a second-best world lies above or below the social marginal 
damages(MED)?”  is  the cornerstone of much recent literature.   
         
 Earlier view (optimistic DD):  The second-best optimal pollution tax would be higher than necessary just to correct the 
externality(=MED).  
               e.g.,  Tullock (1967), Terkla (1984), Lee & Misiolek (1986), Pearce (1991), Repetto et al (1992), Nordhaus (1993) 
 
 Recent studies (pessimistic DD):  Environmental taxes typically exacerbates pre-existing tax distortions and, therefore, the 
optimal pollution tax should lie below the Pigouvian level (≡ social marginal damages)  –  the critical role of “pre-existing 
tax distortions” and negative “tax interaction” effects   
  e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Goulder(1995), Parry(1995), Oats(1995), Fullerton(1997), etc.   
 
 More recent studies (mixed DD, but generally optimistic): 
The prospects of DD depends on various parameters on the structure of preferences and technology (e.g., degree of relative 
complementarity of taxed dirty good w.r.t. leisure,  ; demand elasticity of taxed dirty good, D  etc.)  or  “Whether the 
second-best pollution tax (tD*)  should be greater (or less) than the first-best pollution tax (τP≡ MED)” depends on the 
following many factors (e.g., MED, prior income tax rates (tL), tax rate on scarcity rents by non-auctioned permits((t∏) , 
and some  key elasticities in related markets, etc.)   
        e.g., Kim (2002), Bovenberg and Goulder(2002), West and Williams(2004),Ballard et al.(2005),  etc. 
 
=>   Generalized second-best environmental tax rules (Kim, 2002) 
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where    1)1/(1 1  ULL ttM   is marginal excess burden of  prior income taxes. 
 
 
Fig.  A6.   The Literature on ETR and employment:  “Weak” form of Green Growth (I) 
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Fig.  A7.  Comparison of Marginal Excess Burden : Energy vs. Labor Taxes 
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Can tighter environmental regulation or taxes boost economic growth (i.e., Green Growth, GG)?  If so, when?  
 
 
<Two contrasting views> 
 
 Exogenous Growth Models (Ramsey-style, Solow):  pessimistic GG 
- Technical change is modeled as “exogenous” parameter. 
- Optimal Pollution control hurts growth by raising abatement costs. 
                 e.g., Jorgenson & Wilcoxen(1990), Xepapadeas(1993), Tahvonen & Kuuluvainen(1993), Nordhaus(1994), 
Goulder(1995), Nordhaus & Boyer(1999), etc. 
 
  
 Endogenous (or New) Growth Models (Romer, Lucas,  Barro, Rebelo,  etc.): optimistic GG 
- Technical change becomes additional “endogenous” variable  
      (additional factor of production via investment in knowledge or technology)  
- Optimistic view on the growth-environment relationship 
(a tighter environmental policy may boost economic growth, at least in the long-run).   
               e.g., Bovenberg and Smulders(1995, 1996), Elbasha and Roe(1996),  Stokey(1996),  Bovenberg and de  
Mooij(1997), Hettich(2000), Fullerton and Kim(2008), etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  A8.  The Literature on ETR and growth:  “Strong” form of Green Growth (II) 
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Fig.  A9.  Conventional View on ETR and growth 
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Fig.  A10.   New View on ETR and growth 
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(a).  Small gap: “win-win” is highly likely  
 
  
 
(b).  large gap: “win-win”is modest 
 
 
Fig.  A11.   Optimal Environmental Policy for Green Growth 
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Economic growth, g 
social welfare, W 
(gmax) (Wmax)                                    
W 
g, W 
Economic growth, g 
social welfare, W 
(gmax)   (Wmax)                                    
Pollution-conversion factor ()
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gap
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Denmark 4.65%,  Norway 3.67%,  Netherlands 3.63%,  Filand 3.27% 
 
>  Korea 2.92%  > OECD avg.  2.71% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  A12.    Environmentally related taxes as percent of GDP (2005) 
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Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2007 
 
 
Fig.  A13.   Environmentally related taxes vs. Other income taxes:  International comparison  
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
National Debt (tril. Won) 122.1 133.6 165.7 203.1 248 282.8 298.9 309 
Debt-GDP ratio (%) 18.7 18.5 21.6 24.6 28.7 31.1 30.7 30.2 
Tax Revenue (tril. Won) 122.5 135.5 147.8 152 163.4 179.3 205 212.8 
Tax-GDP ratio (%) 18.8 18.8 19.3 18.4 18.9 19.7 21 20.8 
Source: MOSF(2009) 
 
Fig.  A14.   National Debt, Tax Revenue, and Tax Structure in Korea  
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Source: NTS(2009), MOSF(2009) 
 
 
 
Fig.  A15.   Environmentally related taxes vs. Other taxes in Korea 
tax revenue composition (1990-2005, Korea)
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(a) Personal Income Taxes (b) Corporate Income Taxes 
  
(c) Consumption Taxes (d) Property Taxes 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, 2009 
 
 
Fig.  A16.   Trends of Tax Structure : Korea vs. OECD average 
 
 
